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What makes governments more responsive and how can we create incentives
for them to improve the quality of the public good provided by them? This
paper tries to give theoretical and empirical insights into this question, that be-
came salient issues as the role of the qualtiy of governance has been recognised,
by particulary looking at what the role of direct democratic institutions could
play. We present a model with three parties that are elected via proportional
representation. Parties need to form coalitions in order to be able to imple-
ment policy. Citizens endogenously decide whether to launch a referendum or
a citizens’ initiatives. By looking at the cost of this process to the citizens we
show that when the direct democratic instituions are more open the legislator
may increase his e¤ort to provide the public good. We also …nd that as the cost
goes to zero the medain voter preferred outcome will always be implemented.
We test this results empirically by looking at the experience of Swiss Can-
tons that used such institutions extensively. By looking at infant mortality
rates and an index of fatal tra¢c accidents, proxying the quality of the health
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1sector and infrastructure, we …nd some empirical support that, after control-
ling for other factors more openness leads to better public goods. The role of
religious and linguistic fractionalization is dicussed, too.
Keywords: Citizens’ inititatives, referendums, proportional representation,
quality of public goods, infant mortality, infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
Can we make governments more responsive with direct democratic institutions? How
can we create incentives for them to improve the quality of the public good? These
questions are very much at the heart of the political economy literature just as of
the many recent public debates. However little formal research has been done to
investigate these two questions jointly. Also the literature that addresses the question
in this context on how to improve the quality of public goods is also quite limited.
This paper tries to give theoretical and empirical insights into both these questions
that became salient issues as the role of the qualtiy of governance has been recognised
to have an important impact on the economy just as on the people’s satisfation with
their government.
In the theoretical part of this paper we present a model of a democracy with
proportional representation and the option of a referendum or a citizens’ initiative.1
In a recent paper Besley and Coate (2000) present a model with the option of a
citicens’ initiative within a framework of a representative democracy with a two-
dimensional policy space under majority rule. One policy dimension is continuous
whereas the other dimension is a discrete. They show how the inititative’s sequential
voting porperty yields a policy outcome that is closer to the median voters’ preferences
in both dimensions. If this is desirable than this can improve upon a constitution
without a citizen’s initiaitve. The issue of the public goods quality however is not a
question of the median voter alone. When voters are concerned about quality, the
e¤ect of it may still not be valued equally by voters who di¤er in their preference over
the public good to which the quality is related. We present a model where quality is
provided by politicians of varying degree of competence. The more competent they
are the easier it is for them to provide quality. Voters on the other hand will try to
use elections to replace those politicians that are incompetent. When voters can not
provide quality themselves, they need the politicians to do it for them, the question
is why and how citizens’ initiatives can a¤ect the quality of public goods. Another
cantral issue is the choice of electoral rule in the model. The vast majority in the
political economy literature has focused on pure majority rule. When only a single
elected policy maker is chosen to implement policy, the presence of an inititive need
1An initiative is the right of citizens outside the legislature to originate legislation. Further
description of the institutions are given below.
2not have an e¤ect on the quality of the policy outcome. When the incumbent is
motivated to get reelected only as much e¤ort will be put into increasing the quality
of the public good as to ensure reelection by the majority of voters. Introducing the
option of citizens’ initiatives may not give fundamentally di¤erent incentives other
than those implicit in the incumbent’s career concern.
We can yet construct a framework when the delegation of policy making with
policy initiatives gives rise to less trivial situation by changing the electoral rule from
a pure-majority to a system of proportional representation.2 Under the latter system
a coalition between parties need to form in parliament to pass laws when none of
them by itself has at least half the seats in the legislature. The e¤ect of a referendum
or a policy inititative can, then, be distinct from a system with pure majority rule
where only a single candidate or party gets to decide policy. The reason for this
lies in the di¤erent composition of the coalitions inside and outside of parliament.
Policy decided by coalition partners in parliament can in principal be challenged by
a constructive citizens’ inititative that is supported by a di¤erent coalition of voters
outside parliament. The ruling parties in parliament need not only anticipate voter
satisfaction to ensure reelection, but they also need to consider that a di¤erent voter-
coalition than that in parliament can form. They can then tilt the type of public
good being implemented towards this out-of-parliament coalition’s preference.
Each party has a di¤erent level of most preferred public good provision and these
parties represent the three types of policy preference present in the population, too.
Take a case when the level of public good is decided by a coalition between party
A and B, called AB, and there is a third party C in parliament and that none
of the parties alone has a majority. The coalition partners jointly choose the level
of public good provided but also how much e¤ort they should put into its delivery
therby a¤ecting its quality. With the motivation of reelection coaltion AB bargains
over the optimal pair of level and e¤ort. This choice of optimal policy would be
di¤erent for the other pairwise coalitions AC and BC. If this coalition is o¤ering a
policy that is far form the optimal choice of, say, a coalition BC, then voters outside
parliament have an incentive to form a voter-coalition to challange this policy. They
will be successful in their challenge since any two group of voters, by construction,
will be a majority and then it is the initiative’s policy that will be implemented using
the quality investments that have already been made by the coalition partners in
parliament. When the policy of the inititiative is far away form the legislators most
preferred policy than they will accomodate to this in order to keep the privilege of
implementing policy themselves. They can do this in two ways, by choosing a di¤erent
level of expenditure or by investing more into the quality of the public good. Which
if these two instruments is chosen depends then on the marginal cost to the legislator
of accomodating by quality or by quantity.
We show that when direct democratic institution are more open the amount of
2See Austen-Smith (2000) and Baron and Diermeier (forthcoming) for a recent analyses of rep-
resentative democracies under proportional representation.
3e¤ort put into providing quality is higher in certain cases.
In the emprical part of this paper we look at the experience of Swiss Cantons
between 1970 and 1996. Switzerland is devided into 26 regions, called Cantons, which
are highly autonomeous both politically and …nancially. Each Canton’s parliament
is elected by proportional representation. Under this system many parties can be
elected into parliament which makes the formation of coalitions necessary in order to
pass laws under the majoritarian decision rule in parliament. However, the largest
vote share goes to four major parties, FDP, CVP, SVP and SPS, representing a braod
polical spectrum.3 Parties elected into parliament need to …nd coalition partners to
gather the necessary number of seats/votes in order to pass laws in parliament by
majority rule, unless, of course, a single party holds more than half of the seats.
Broadly speaking there are two types of direct democratic institutions. A ref-
erendum allows voters to approve or to reject a law that has been authored by the
legislator. When a referendum approves a law, it is enacted. Otherwise it has to
be revised and voted upon again or it is abandoned. The second type of institution
is the citizen’s initiative where voters can put a policy decision directly onto the
agenda.4 The legsilative initiative then has to be approved by the majority of vot-
ers. Refrendums and citizen’s initiatives are subject to certain administrative rules
a¤ecting the openness of these institutions. Two rules are particulary important in
this regard. The …rst rule is the number of signatures that has to be collected among
the electorate, thereby showing the support for the issue. The second rule is the time
constraint that within which these signatures have to be collected. Both these mea-
sures of openness vary across time and across Cantons. This gives us an indication
for the openness of these institutions.
In order to measure the quality of public goods we need to …nd a variable that
is available for all Cantons and all years and which is comparable across time and
across space. The variable also needs to re‡ects the quality under the in‡uence of
the cantonal government. Only recently has data been collected for the purpose to
measure quality.5 However we tried to …nd measures that are available for a much
longer period of time than the range for which these surveys provided data.6 Never-
theless we believe to have found variables that can be adequately used as measures of
quality. We mainly looked at two areas of public good provision: road infrastructure
3FDP (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz) ”Swiss Radical-Democratic Party”, CVP
(Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz) ”Swiss Christian-Democratic People’s Party”,
SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei) ”Swiss People’s Party” SPS (Sozialdemokratische Partei der
Schweiz) ”Swiss Social-Democratic Party”. These parties are also referred to as ”Ratsparteien”
(Council Parties), as they hold the seven seats of in the federal council, the executive body, whose
distribution of seats among these 4 parties stayed unchanged by tacit agreement since 1959 .
4See Trechsel (2000), and Trechsel and Serdült (1999) for a thorough survey.
5An institute devoted to this in Switzerland is the BADAS(?) in Lausanne.
6For instance the Audit Commission in the U.K. publishes a list of indicators for each borough
that re‡ects how many time garbage has not been collected in a period of time or survey results
on whether the instructions on some tax form are understandable just as if the service providing
council housing is friendly and helpful.
4and public health. For the former we looked at the safety of the streets as measuerd
by the ratio of tra¢c fatalities to the total number of accidents. In the case of health
we took the infant mortaltiy rate. We found some empirical support, after control-




The model has two periods. In the …rst period policy is determined by a set of
incumbents, explained more in detail below, that choose a policy and quality mix
who then stand for election for the second period together with other candidates.
There are i = 1;:::;N citizens with preferences over a one-dimensional public good
x 2 [0;1] and endowed with a private good y. Each citizen’s preference over the
public good takes on one of three values. Denote j 2 fH;M;Lg the preference type
and nj = Nj=N the share of j-types in the population. Each citizen then has a most
preferred policy outcome zj where zH > zM > zL. In what follows we assume zH = 1,
zM = 1
2, zL = 0. To make the model interesting we assume that no single group has
a majority, i.e. nj < 1
2. Voters also care about the quality of public good q which
can only be in‡uenced by the legislator. To abstract form wealth e¤ects a citizen’s
quasi-linear utility before the election is seperable in goods and we can write:
Ui(x;q;y;j;´) = u(x;q;j;´) + y (1)
where u(x;j;´) is strictly concave, single peaked at zj and symmetric. The pa-
rameter ´ refers to the policy maker’s competence referred to in the next section. For
the purpose of this paper we assume that for every x 6= zj the impact of a sub-optimal
quality is to reduce utility. To get a closed form solution we take the following utility
function for the voters:
Ui(x;q;y;j;´) = ´(¡jx ¡ z
jj + q) + y (2)
For the ease of notation we think of x as the utility of the public good net of
taxes.
2.2 Voting under proportional representation
2.2.1 Background
A core feature of this model is the type of electoral rule. The legislature in Swiss
cantons is deteremined by proportional representation in which the party’s vote shares
5determine the number of seats allocated to them on the legislature. Proportional
representation is also the electoral rule in 21 of 28 Western Countries and in most of
Central Europe and other recently democratized countries.7 In contrast to the single-
member district plurality vote, where only one representative is elected per district,
proportional systems translate the vote shares of each party or candidate into several
seats in the district’s legislature. There are a number of systems to allocate the
seats according to the vote shares like, for example, the ”largest remainder formula”
to address the problem of mapping the vote shares, which can in principal be any
number between zero and one, into the …nite number of seats in the legislture. We
abstract from the problem however and assume that each party receives a fraction of
the total number of seats identical to her vote share.
The voting procedures under proportional representation can be usefully divided
into two systems: the open and the closed list. Under a closed list, voters cast their
vote for a party and the vote share determines how many of each party’s candidates
receive a seat in parliament. With the open list, voter’s have an additional degree of
freedom as they can vote for candidates directly. In that they can not only in‡uence
the weight of each party but also the identity of the elected. In game of this section
we will take the open list as a basis for the computation of equlibria, i.e. we assume
that voters can choose the party and the candidate. However we must note that
under a closed list the only way a voter can sanction a party through the election
process itself is by simply voting for one of the other parties. The credibility of the
threat will then determine as to how poorly the governments can allow themselves
to perform. A voter deviates from voting for the party which is a priori closest to
her most preferred policy outcome per se, when she can reasonably assume that by
voting for one of the other parties she will get compensated for a loss along the policy
dimension by an increase in quality. Under an open list, however, voters can choose
candidates from a list directly and therefore sanction a bad member of government
without having to compromise on the policy dimension.8
7An incomplete list of these countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and Switzerland. Examples among the recently democratized countries are in Europe Slovenia,
Hungary, and Poland and for Africa the Rep. of South Africa. In these countries di¤erent degrees
of poportional representation (or mixed forms of plurality rule and PR) are used on municipal, re-
gional, and on national levels. In the Anglo-Saxon systems plurality rule is more common although
New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales recently introduced a form of PR.
8There are many other strategic considerations related to the design of the list. One issue is that
candidates can be seen as being either technocratic, i.e. a technical expert, or telegenic. Whereas
the former can implement policies well the latter is the better at communicating with the public
and at persuading voters during the campaign. A further issue is patronage, i.e. how the set-up of
the list is controled. From casual observation in German municipal elections, candidates that are
hardly known by the public are found high up on the list which gives them a high probability to
be elected which can be either motivated by patronage or by the parties strategic interest to get
technically competent people which are not telegenic into parliament that in order to be perform
well once in o¢ce.
62.2.2 Modelling proportional representation
To stylize the analysis, let there be a set of candidates where the candidates can be
of one of the three types of citizens. So each elected candidate is identical in their
most preferred policy outcome to one of the citizen’s types. Voters can only give
their vote to one candidate and only one cnadiate type-j can go into parliament. So
each type of candidate will then be represented by the vote shares and the outcome
of the election is a vector of vote shares s = fsL;sM;sHg that goes to the three
most successful candidates of each of the three types. These vote shares are then
directly translated into the share of seats in parliament.9 We assume that the vote
share, which corresponds to the number of seats in a legislature, also determines each
candidate’s bargaining power in parliament .
2.3 Political environment and competence
At the beginning of the …rst period parliament will be comppsed by three incumbent
candidates that have seat shares that sorrespond to the fraction in the population,
i.e. a candidate of type j will receive a fraction nj of the preferctly divisible seats
on parliament. The fraction of each type in the population is common knowledge.
When an elected candidate has more than half of the vote shares she or he can decide
policy alone. However for the case where for all types j, sj < 1
2 the constitutional
requirement is to form a coalition of (at least) two candidates need to be formed in
order to be able to decide on policy.
Candidates also have a competence ´ 2 f 1
B; 1
Gg; with equal probability where B
stands for bad and G stands for good and B < G: The level of competence of the
incumbent is privatley observed before policy is chosen. This means that the utility
derived from policy both by the voters and the legislators made (weakly) worse when









for any given x; zj, and q: Similarly, competence is observed by candidates stand-
ing for election other than the incumbents only once they are in o¢ce.
As the model has two periods with an election stage at the beginning of the second
period voters use the election to try to reappoint those candidates that have high
competence or to oust incompetent one and replace them by an alternative candidate







: In order to concentrate on the quality
and signalling issue we want to abstaract from the issue of pure startagies under
which voters vote for a candidate that does not have the same type as herself.10.
9We think of the number of seats in the legilsator as a real number that can be subdivided into
any other real number.
10Mixed startegies remain when this is possible but we want to focus on the more appealing pure
strategies in this paper.
7The incumbents are career concerned to get reelected in the sense that they derive
an additional ego-rent R form re-election. To deliver on the quality dimension is costly
to the legislators. We can now write the full utlity function of the incumbent policy
maker that gets to decide policy
U
C
i (x;q;y;j;´) = ´(¡jx ¡ z
jj + q) ¡ (´q)
2 + y + pCR (3)
so total cost of quality is ´q ¡ ´q2 which is concave in quality and competence
dependent. Incumbents are reelected with a probability pC:
We can now summarize the timing of events and the assumption on coalition
formation.
A1) Three incumbents, one of each type j 2 fL;M;Hg; are selected by nature
each of them endowed with a competence and the number of seats of type-j
incumbent is determined by nj; i.e. the fraction of that type in the population.
This also detemines her bargaining power.
A2) Each incumbent simultaneously and independently announces his most pre-
ferred coalition partner.
A3) A coalition is a binding contract for the whole legislative period.11
A4) The coalition with the majority of vote shares has agenda setting power.
A5) Policy is decided by the majority of seats
A6) The outcome of the policy decision is dermined by Nash Bargaining Solution.
2.4 Coalition Formation and bargaining
The …rst two assumptions imply that a utility maximizing candidate chooses the
coalition partner that gives her the highest pay-o¤ and each incumbent reveals the
most preferred coalitions partner. Denote Cj the most preferred coalition partner
by candidate j and C the set of candidate types in the coalition resulting from the
coalition formation game. A5 requires some further notation. Let dj(x) = f0;1g be
an incumbent’s decision to approve or to reject policy x, where dj(x) = 1 stands for
“policy x approved”. A policy porposed by the coalition and submitted to a vote is
approved by parliament if
P
j dj(x)sj ¸ 1
2.
The outcome of bargaining over policy in the coaltion is determined by Nash
Bargaining between the coalition partners. The details of the bargaing process depend
on the presence of the policy initiative stage. When an initiative is available then
11This implies that when a coalition partner wishes to break the coalition, new elections have to
take place. This corresponds to observation of the working of parliaments. It is most unusual to
have a broken coalition during a legislative period that does not entail an early call for election.
8the set of possible utility pairs for the coalition partners on which Nash’s bargaining
solution should be de…ned. For instance when C = fL;Mg then the common platform


















C) for j 2 fL;Mg:
where xC is the policy selected by the coalition partners and xI is the policy chosen by
the initiative. We will discuss in further detail how the initiative policy ise determined
in the next section.
A note on the competence of the coalition Only when the tow partners enter
the coalition do they learn their own and each others type. We assume that the
competence of the coalition is a determined by the sum of the coalition partners’




(nj´j + nk´k) (4)
where j and k stands for the type of the two coaltion partners.
2.5 Policy making and choosing quality
The task of the coalition in parliamnet is to chose and to implement policy. Once a
coalition is formed they alone are endowed with the technology that in‡uences the
level of quality. Therefore the initiative can only in‡uence the level of the public
good but it is not in the position to alter quality in the initiative directly. The idea
is that the legislators are the residual decision takers and no complete contract can
be written for the legislators outside the coalition to in‡uence quality. It is simply to
costly to de…ne and specify the targets for quality and how it could be veri…ed if they
are met by an outside (constitutional) court.12 Once the cost to develop quality are
incurred it can not be undone. 13 Cost of search is borne by members of the coalition
only.
The level of investment into the production of quality q is not obeserved by the
voters. All the that the voters observe is the level of the public good x and the …nal
utility they (would) derive Ui(x; ~ q;y;j;~ ´): Therfore all they can infer is an estimate of
the level of competence (~ ´)and the investment of the coalition partners into quality
(~ q). More on this in the next section.
12Alternatively one can think of the case that a quality …rst has to be developped before it can
be decided if it is appropriate. This is a further motivaiton why policy making is delegated to a
legislature as only they have the resources to develop the quality.
13One can think of this costly search as a sequence of “debates” in parliament or in commitees
where the various possiblities are discussed. As we are primarily interested as to the e¢ciency of
the search which is increasing in cost, the debate is not modelled.
92.6 Constructive citizens’ initiatives
Once parliament has approved a policy voters can decide whether to challange the
policy. Several scenarios occur in the Swiss cantons:
1. For speci…c policy decision, a referendum is compulsory.
2. Policies can be challenged by a facultative referendum.
3. Voters can put forward a policy inititative.
In the …rst case the policy approved by parliament is automatically subjected to
a vote. In the second case voters …rst have to organise the collection of a certain
number of votes signatures within a time limit before a popular vote. In the third
case an policy that is not on the agenda of the coalition is subjected to a popular
once signatures have been successfuly collected.
In what follows we will be concentrating on a combination of the last two cases in
which a policy can be vetoed by a facultative referendum and an alternative policy
is put forward instead. After the coalition has proposed a policy, voters receive a
signal about a the impact of the policy on their utility. This utility is in‡uenced by
a combination of the legislators competence and the level of quality.14
To model the policy initiative process we follow the approach proposed in Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989) of providing a public good by private contributions.15 Speci…cally
let there be a group that wants to challenge the policy by an initiative. A citizen
wishing to join this group …rst pledges a contribution ¸ to pay for the process. We
think of this as the exogenous cost to each group member of the organisation of
the initiative that is determined by the institutional set-up of this institution. For
an inititative to be successful at least the majority have to approve of it in a vote
where no abstention is allowed.16 If enough citizens have deposited the subscription
fee such that the referendum can be successful the group launches the referendum
process. If not, the pledged contributions are refunded. By assumption members of
the legislature can not join a policy initiative group.
14One can think of a newspaper, or an institute like the NBER in the U.S.A. or the I.F.S. in
the U.K. that evaluates the policy chosen by the government for the voters. So far we take this
signal as a truthful evaluatuion of the impact of the policy and that this evulation is understood
by all voters. This may be restrictive in particular when we think of developing countries or non
democratic countries where these information channels are poorly developped or absent. For an
example of the e¤ect of the media on government responsiveness see Besley, Burgess (2000).
15See an application by Felli and Merlo (2000) of this subscription game to endogenize lobbying
in a citizen-candidate model of represenatative democracy.
16We could allow for abstention. Then those voters that are indi¤ernet between the two poropo-
sitions don’t vote. This could then give rise to the possiblity that one group of voters is indi¤erent
and then only one group needs to be in favour and one against and the larger group will win.
10When the number of subscriptions is less then half of the population then the
policy initiative has not been successful and the policy of the coalition will be imple-
mented .
2.7 Solving the game
In what follows we solve backwards for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibira (Fudenberg,
Tirole ,1991) of the policy setting and quality investment game when incumbents are
career concerned and voters want to re-elect the competent incumbent only.
At the end of the …rst period each voter of type j decides if he votes for the
incumbent of type j to represent his interests in the legislature or if he wants to
choose another candidate of the same policy preference type. To concentrate on the
signalling for competence of each type we assume that voters never …nd it in their
interest to give their vote to a candidate that is not of their own type.17 Voters
threfore form beliefs on the incumbents type based on the signals that they observe.
The signalling space here comprises a the level of expenditure xC and the utility
derived from the public good u(¢): Beliefs over the competence denoted as ~ ´ are
formed when the signal pair fxC;u(¢)g is observed and are derived as
~ ´ =
u(¢)
¡jx ¡ zjj + ~ q
(5)
Note as ~ ´ and ~ q can not be observed seperately a voter can only make an estimate
of these variables. From the perspecitve of the incumbent his probability of reelection
can then be written as
pI =
½
1 i¤ ~ ´ = 1
G
0 otherwise. (6)
2.7.1 Signalling of types
Each incumbent can invest in quality and the competence and the com-
petence type determines how good she is at procing quality. In the ab-
sence of career siganlling due to career concerns and incumbent chooses
q¤ = 1
2´2: However a good incumbent will try to seek a seperating equlib-
rium in order to signal his type. When the income endowment y is high
enough there always exist seperating equlibria fro coalitions where both
candidates have the same level of competence.
De…nition 1 A coalition is homogeneous when all its members have the same level
of competence ´: Otherwise a coalition is heterogeneous.
17This is seems very strong and it awaits more work to …nd out if this is true in equilibrium. For
example one can think of cases when it is better to reelect someone that is of a known good type
than to choose someone that is of an unknown type.
11Lemma 2 All equlibria for homogeneous coalitions are separating.
Proof. (sketch) Each coalition can be composed by four levels of competence.
One level where both incumbents are H-types, another level when both incumbents
are L-types, and two levels of competence, as determined by ´jk = 1
nj+nk(nj´j+nk´k)
when one of the incumbents is H and the other L; for nj 6= nk: The maximum of
quality investment any type of candidate can a¤ord is the level ^ q(´j) that solves
´(¡jx ¡ z
jj + q
C) ¡ (´^ q)
2 + y = 0:
where qC = qj + qk is the some of investment by both coalition partners. Since the
fraction of the seats is common knowledge to the voters they can therfore derive a
maximum quality attainable for each combination of competences in the coalition.
As the quality level is detemined by the investment levels of both incumbents in
the coalition stage each member of the coalition has an incentive to signal her type
by increasing q in response to the observation of the coalition partner’s type. For
the case when both are H-types then for a any y > · y then by setting a qC(H;H)
=qC(L;L)+"; where " is a small positive number the homogeneous high competence
separates from the homogenous low competence coalition. Next for the homogenoues
high type coaltion to seperate from is high enough there again exists a y > · y such
that by setting a qC(H;H) =qC(H;L) + "; where the H-types in the hetreogeneous
coalition have a higher seat share, a separtation is achieved. The · y when this is true
solves ^ qC(H;H) > ^ qC(H;L); with nj > nk:
2.7.2 Policy Initiative stage
The inititative is constructive in the sense that those citizens supporting it present a
platform of public good level xI that the legislature has to implement.18
The initiative has three stages: (i) entry, (ii) bargaining for the initiatives platform
and (iii) voting. to overcome to free-rider problem we employ the implementation
framwork by Bagnoli Lipman (1986) where citizens can pledge funds to provide the
public good simultaneously and independently. By this process each citizen is pivotal
and the public good is provided. For the referendum vote to be successful at least
two groups of voter types need to vote together in the same way as the size of nj < 1
2
for all j. Therefore each voter of type j has the choice to pledge a contribution to
one of two possible extra-parliamentary groups I(j;k), j;k 2 fL;M;Hg;j 6= k, which
are between one of the other two types. So a type L can either join a group with
18It is thus not a simple referendum where the voters are consulted whether a policy should be
implemented or not nor a pure initiative where they force a policy onto the agenda of the legislature
but a combination of both. To analyze the institutions seperately requires a model with a multiple
policy dimension as in Besley, Coate (2000).
12M or with H-types.19 For a given policy and the associated utility proposed by the
coalition (xC;uC
i ) each voter needs to decide to which group to pledge the amount.
As citizens can not develop the quality q to implement policy themselves, they take
the method developped by the coalition but can force them to implement a di¤erent
level of policy, called xI; via the constructive inititaitive. Therefore citizen j pledges
a contribution to group R whenever
~ ´(¡jx
C ¡ z
jj + ~ q) < ~ ´(¡jx
I(j;k) ¡ z
jj + ~ q) ¡ ¸ (7)
where ^ xI is the initiatives policy platform and ¸ is the …xed cost for the group
member to launch the referendum.
Each citizen pledges a fund to the group conditional on the types of citizens joining
them. In other words each citizen when deciding to pledge has a preference over the
composition of the group as it will determine the initiative group’s policy platform.
Let S be the set of citizens types who join the group R. The platform determined by












When bargaining over the policy initiatives platform xR, we assume that the
bargaining power of each citizen type is determined by the number of these types
devided by the total number of citizens joining the group. The threat points for each
citizen type is the utility she or he can get when the policy chosen by coalition is
implemented for a given method pair of estimates (~ ´; ~ q). Each citizen of type j then






jj + ~ q) (10)
subject to constraint (7) and where ^ xI(j;k) is determined by equation (8).
When two citizen types pledge funds to a group that contains each others types as
the preferred group partner then the policy inititaive goes ahead with a group called
R¤(j;k) and will be successful as the majority of the voters, i.e. the group member
types, will vote in favour of it.
The outcome of the policy initiative stage is therefore a vector fR¤(j;k); ^ xR¤(j;k)g.
2.7.3 Policy selection in the legislature (incomplete)
The policy selected in the legislature takes into account the outcome of the policy
initiative stage when choosing the optimal level of e¤ort eC that in‡eunces the prob-
ability of …nding the best method and the level of public good xC. Any coalition
19It can be straightfrowardly shown that a citizen group between all three types can never be the
mutual best response for all three citizen types. To ease the notation a bit we only focus on pairwise
groups.
13partner therefore solves a set of simultaneous equations one for the bargaining so-
lution in the legislature and one for the solution of the bargaining solution between
policy initiative group members. We can now state the following result.
Lemma 3 The equlibrium of the policy initiative group formation stage for a given
legislative coalition is unique and a policy initiative is launched if constraint (7) holds.
Sketch or a Proof: To prove this we …rst need to …nd the policy outcome for each
coalition and each policy initiative group composition. Then we need to show that
given these resulting pay-o¤s for a given vote share distributution only one group
composition is an equilibrium. In the legislature coalition partners solve the system
of equations:
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :

















s:t: ´jk(¡jxC ¡ zjj + qC) > ´jk(¡jxI(j;k) ¡ zjj + qC)
^ xI¤(j;g) = argmax
³
~ ´(¡jx




I¡zgj + ~ q) + y ¡ ¸
´ nj
nj+ng
s:t: ~ ´(¡jxC ¡ zjj + ~ q) < ~ ´(¡jxI(j;k) ¡ zjj + ~ q) ¡ ¸
where qC = qj + qk and from the perspective of the coalition partners in the
legilsator ´jk = ~ ´ and qC = ~ q and where j and k are the coalition partner types and
j and h are group member types in the policy initiative and j;k;g 2 fL;M;Hg;j 6=
k;j 6= g, xI = xI(j;g):
Therefrore the coaltion in the legislator and the group outside it take each others
actions in to acount. The coalition parties therefore will try to make at least two
groups of voters indi¤erent in the way that for them it is true ~ ´(¡jxC ¡ zjj + ~ q) ¸
~ ´(¡jxI(j;k) ¡ zjj + ~ q) ¡ ¸, i.e. it is not utility increasing to launch an initiative.
We can also state a remarkable result that has not been present in earlier papers
in such clarity.
Remark 4 When the cost of a organizing a referendum or a citizen’s initiative goes
to zero (¸ ! 0) the the polciy implemented will be the median preferred policy x = 1
2:
2.7.4 Coalition formation
There are two classes of pairwise coalition equilibria in this sub-game for the case
when no member has an absolute majority in the vote share, i.e. sj < 1
2 for all
j. First, when two members mututally declare each other as their preferred coalition
partner and the third member declares either of the other two as the preferred partner.
14Second, when no two members declare each other as most preferred coalition partners.
In the …rst case a colation is formed in the second it is not. Figure 1 gives an example
for these two classes of equlibria. However we can rule these cases out quite clearly.20
Lemma 5 Coalitions are unique and always form whenever no single party has more
than half of the votes.
Proof. By comparing outcome of the coalition process contained in proof of
lemma (3).
Finally we can state the central result of the paper.
Claim 6 A lower cost of the direct democratic institution translates into a higher
e¤ort to increase the quality of public goods for homogeneous low coalition types.
The idea of this proposition is a bit more involved. Without the problem of
signalling any coalition group would choose the level of quality such that q¤ = 1
2´2:
Recall that in the seperating equlibria of the signalling game the high types will
typically invest more in quality to signal their types.
Now add the citizens’ initiatives. When an initiative is launched successfully the
coalition in the legislature will no longer be implementing the the level of the public
good xC but it is the initiative groups policy xI that will be chosen. The disadvantage
of losing control over implementing the policy themselves is that the utility that a
member of the legislator receives form the initiatives policy may be lower.
Now to accomodate for this situation the coalition has two instruments. It can
either change the level of public good which is associated with a marginal cost to utilty
of @u
@x = ¡´; or it can invest more into the quality at a marginla cost @u
@qj = ´ ¡
2qj
´ :
Comparing these costs shows that for very low levels of q it is more pro…table to
accomodate by increasing the quality than by changing the level of the public good
xC: This result is therefore true when in the absence of the initiative the level of
quality were low which is the case for the homogeneous low competence coalition. In
the other cases the coalition members compare ¡´ S ´ ¡
2qj
´ :
To summarize more open direct democratic institutions, as re‡ected by a lower
cost to those who want to support the motion, translates in certain cases into a
higher e¤ort to produce quality by the legislator and therefore in a higher quality.
Equally when this cost goes to zero the median voter’s preferred policy outcome will
be implemented. When this cost is positive however, the coaltion in the legislator
takes into account this cost and therefore the outcome will be biased towards the
preference of the coaliton in government which ulitmately is determined by the size
in the population of the di¤erent groups.
20In an earlier version of this paper we used insetad of the Nash Bargaining Solution a bargaining
process where coalition partners take the a medium between their two most preferred policy outcomes
wighted by their bargaining power which is given by their vote share or the size of that group in the
total population. Results are available on request.
153 Institutional framework in the Swiss Cantons
Anticipating the empirical set-up presented in the next section we brie‡y present the
institutional di¤erences between 21 Swiss Cantons. As mentioned earlier there are a
number of institutions and each of them di¤ers substantially accross cantons.21
to …x the terminology it is important to understand the general di¤erence between
initiatives and referendums: in the former the author is a group of citizens and in the
latter it is the legilsator.
A …rst type of institution is the referendum for total or partial revision of the
constitution. This referendum is authored by the legislator and not by the electorate
and has been present in all the cantons. The second type is the legislative referendum
concerning all general or abstract changes in norms that subject a person or a com-
pany to responabilities or endow it with further rights and any institutions regulating
them. This option has not been present in all of the cantons and is less and less
present as we move along time: whereas 11 out of 26 cantons had it in 1970, only
eight still retained it in 1996. However this evolution has been compensated by a
sharp increase of the legislative intitiative. Referendums can either by compulsory
or facultative, where in the latter case a speci…ed number of signatures has to be
collected within a time constraint, but not in the former.
The third type is the constitutional inititative where the initiator is not the legis-
lator but some group of voters. This institution has been available in 19 cantons in
1970 and in 21 cantons in 1996.
In Switzerland the institutional framework depends on whether the legislation
has been inititally authored by the legislator himself and then challenged by the
people or by the people themselves that request a vote. Only …ve cantons had the
former institutions in 1970 but eleven in 1996. For the latter case, with the people’s
authorship, much more cantons used this institutions at the beginning and at the
end of the time period: 20 cantons in 1970 and 21 cantons in 1971. A fourth class
of institutions is the expenditure referendum. This refers to laws that are subjected
to a vote purely on the bases of their …nancial volume. This can be either a …xed
amount set by a canton or a ratio of the amount to total expenditures. One can think
of a large construction project like a bridge or a tunnel that then has to be approved
by the voters. Both the facultative expenditures and the compulsory referendum has
been present but only in few cantons.
21In this study as in the rest of this paper only the case of 21 out of 26 cantons is discussed.
Five cantons are excluded as they use avery di¤erecnt sort of assembly, called ”Landsgemeinde”,
involving the whole (male) electorate at a speci…c day in a single place to decide policy. However
we do not have a nested model to compare cantonal decision taking to them as yet and therefore we
therefore excluded these cantons.
163.0.5 Administrative framework
There are two determing factors for how open these institutions are apart form the
salience of an issue, questions of form and certain rules governing constitutionality.
These are, …rstly, the number of signatures to be collected among the electorate and,
secondly, the time available to collect them. To illustrate, the ratio of signatures
to the electorate varied between 0.7% and 14% across cantons and across time for
an initiative. Concerning the time constraint, this varied between 30 and 90 days.
For a referendum on the other hand, when the law is authored by the legislator,
the signatures to electorate ratio varied between 0.7% and 7.8% and the time span
between 90 days and twelve months.
3.1 Cost, openness, and delay
One of the main focuses in this paper is how the cost to the individual, or the
openness of the institutions have an e¤ect on the incentives of the governing coalition
to invest in quality. Openness can be approximated by the number of signatures that
are necessary for a motion to be recognised and the time constraint for collecting
them. Certainly the salience of an issue is a critical factor too and will determine
the ease with which these constraints can be met. Another factor that determines
the cost is the time span between submitting the list of signatures and the moment
when the actual vote takes place. The launch of a motion can be frustrated by the
thought that the actual vote would only take place far in the future. By that time, the
momentumwithin the population created during the collection of the signatures in the
media, the parties or interest groups could be on the wane or the issue itself no longer
corresponding to the spirit of the inititaive due to many changes in between. Still this
delay can also be bene…cial as it allows time for proper debates on controversial issues.
this is even more true when the inititative has complex implications and an exchange
of arguments in the parties, the media, on an academic level and the general public
is important for the success of a policy. In the data we …nd that for 356 citizens’
inititatives between 1970 and 1999 the overall average has been aboout two years
(776 days) with a variation between cantons ranging from 408 days in the canton
of St. Gallen and 1797 days in Basel City.22 In most cantons the period between
the acknowledgment of recieving the signature lists and the voting day is limited in
one way or another to usually three years. In other cantons the legislature has more
discretion as to the schedule of the vote.23
But even with a …xed time limit, the legislator can challenge the constitutionality
22The average in the densely populated City cantons of Geneva, Bern, and Zurich were 973, 542,
and 942 days respectively. No trend over time has been apparent but for Basel City where the delay
decreased from about more than 2000 days in the early seventies down to around 1000 days in the
late nineties.
23Collecting the legisltaive details on these restrictions in the cantons can be an interesting avenue
for future empirical research.
17of the proposal in court. In one case an inititaitve on an infrastruture project was
submitted in March 1980 but subsequently challenged on gorunds of conformity with
the constitution until it reached the Federal Court, the highest level of jurisdiction.
In March 1987 that Court declared that at least a part of the proposal can be voted
upon. This vote eventually took place in March 1995 as the legislator elaborated
a counter-proposition which allowed her to postpone the vote. In all it too …fteen
years from the initial deposit of signatures and the actual vote. A general conclusion
can be drawn for other countries considering the implementation of these institution.
During the design of referendums and initiatives their scope, purpose and principles
must be well de…ned and must take into account the quality of the rule of law to
avoid incomensurable proceedings in court.
A further issue still is the number of initiatives that are handled at any given
point in time both by the public administration and the general public. The total
number of all issues that have been voted on in that period varied between 41 in
Tessin and 380 in Zurich with an average of 146. This means that on average 5 issues
per year where voted on on top of federal and municipal referendums and initiatives.24
The cluttering of issues could therefore be a serious problem in view of the need to
debate the proposal properly.25 The estimated e¤ects on the covariates measuring
the openness and the cost will therefore measure the net e¤ect of each of these factors
and should be interpreted accordinlgy.
3.2 Measuring the Quality of Governance
We also need to …nd a measure for quality that is both comparable across time and
across cantons.
To measure the quality of a public good is far from straightforward as it has to
meet a certain number of criteria. First, the policy under consideration has had to
be determined by under the in‡uence of the cantonal governments. As a general
observation it should be noted that in the aggragate public budgets of the federal,
the cantonal, and the municipal authorities, the cantonal budgets take up more than
50%. In particular we can seperate three broad public goods: education, road in-
frastructure, and health. Second they need to be topics that for the whole period
has drawn the attention of the voters which has been the case for all three of these
areas of public provision. Third as the questions concerned is one of quality, it is
not satisfactory to simply look at cost-e¢ciency as, for example 100 pupils can be
educated at a primary school for less but the quality will su¤er just as when a kilo-
meter of cantonal road is build on a lower budget. My methodology therfore is to
24For a complete discussion of the di¤erences in practice and the observed votes see Trechsel
(2000) and Trechsel and Serdult (1999).
25A frequent criticism gleaned from the Italian experience with initiaitves is that voters are over-
whelmed by the amount and the complexity of the issues. In Switzerland every houshold, at least
recenetly, is sent a short descriptive of the proposed change of law also containing a decleration by
the legislator and a statement by the initiative committee.
18…nd variables measuring outcome rather than output of public goods.
One such outcome concerning the cantonal road networks is tra¢c safety in general
and tra¢c fatalities in particular.26 A large number of referendums and initiatives
have been concerened with the construction of roads and the regulation of tra¢c. For
instance about a tenth of almost 3000 initiatives and referendums between 1970 and
1999 were related to tra¢c and roads documenting the salience of the issue.27 When
it comes to measuring the quality of this public good, mobility, it can be argued that
the quality of roads and the regulation of tra¢c should be re‡ected in the probability
that accidents have a lethal outcome: The e¤ort deployed in clearly marking roads, in
putting up and operating tra¢c lights, in lowering and implementing the alcohol limit
just as in the quality of education of drivers and in the safety standards for vehicles
are a host of instututional regulations and procedures that impact tra¢c safety and
thereby the number of fatalities. Finally it is a measure that is easily comparable
between cantons and across time. Concerning the measurement of quality one also
needs to …nd appropriate scalers. The quantity of accidents a such is not necessarily
a measure of quality as it is subject to the tra¢c volume the density of the road
network the number of vehicles using it, etc. Optimally these numbers need to be
scaled, by the total number of vehicles and kilometers travelled by them in a give
road network. However these scaling variables are not available for the time period
considered or the quality of it is (surprisingly) poor.
We therefore propose to scale the number of fatalities by the total number of
accidents to get an indication as to the hazard rate of an having a lethal accident.
Scaling by the number of vehicles does not seem appropriate as a considerable number
of cars is not or raraly used and there is intense commuing across cantonal frontiers
which is not re‡ected in the number of registered vehicles in a canton and year.
Another measure of quality identifying the quality of the health sector in a well
developped country is the infant mortality rate, which is the ratio of death within
the …rst 12 months of life to the total number of life-born babies. This is a measure
also employed to compare the level of development of the health secotr by the United
Nations and the Audit Commission in the U.K..
3.2.1 Empirical set up and results
The models have been estimated under two di¤erent assumptions concerning the error
terms. In the …rst case the panel has been estimated by a two-way error component
…xed e¤ects model that can be written as
qit = A + pitB1 + xitB2 + ¹i + ¸t + zit (11)
26Measuring the quality of education across cantons and for the time priod in question is not
possible as, to my knowledge, no data set exists or can be constructed to get indicators on school
performance or class size.
27This is not speci…c to Switzerland, witnessing the intense debate in the U.K. about how to
improve the train network after a numerous recent fatalities.
19Where qit refers to the dependent quality measure for each canton i = 1;:::;21
and for each time period t:28 The coe¢cient B1 on pit measures the e¤ect of the
legislation administering the direct democratic institution. These will be composed
of the number of signatures necessary and the length of time available to collect
them. B2 are the coe¢cients on the control variables. The error term is composed
of the canton speci…c ¹i and the time period speci…c ¸t …xed e¤ects29 and a term zit
» IID(0;¾2
z): The results of these regressions are reported in columns (5)-(10) and
(15)-(20) in Tables 2 and 3.
An alternative assumption for the dynamic structure of shocks could lead us to
assume that the groupwise error terms follow an AR(1) process. Indeed, individual
unit root tests on the variables using the procedure proposed in Im et al.(1997) (see
table 5 for results) indicate that most variables are I(1). We therefore also estimated
the following speci…cations
qit = a + pitB1 + xitB2 + ¹i + ¸t + eit (12)
eit = ½ei;t¡1 + zit
where j½j < 1 implementing the procedure for unbalanced panels proposed in Baltagi
and Ping (1999) two types of test results for H0 : ½ = 0 are reported namely the locally
best variant statistic and a modi…ed Durbin-Watson statistic.30 If the hypotheses of
no serial groupwise autocorrelation is accepted then the speci…cation with in equation
(3.2.1) is preferred. When the null is rejected both speci…cations are acceptable in the
absence of sharper prediction by economic theory as to the dynamic strucure.Using
a cross section of time series of cantonal data allows us to compare and to contrast
the di¤erent institutions and also enables a control for idiosyncracies of a canton or
of a speci…c year such as canton speci…c tastes’ and country wide shocks.
We also included some control variables to capture the general level of develop-
ment and other time- variant canton speci…c covariates. These are the real per capita
cantonal revenu, the level of eduction measured by the fraction of the population with
more than 12 years of eduction. A variable that has also emerged as an important
measure for a countries economic and institutional performance is the religious and
linguistic fractionalization of a country as showed in Reynal-Querol (2000) and East-
erly and Levine (1994). This seems in particular important in a country whith high
heterogeneity both between and within cantons. Data is available for the four main
28The time periods for each canton varies from a maximum time span of t = 70;:::;96 to any
subspan of time depending on the presence of a direct institution in a canton. Also the canon Jura
only exists since 1978 created out of a region which until then belonged to the canton of Bern-Land.
Both these types of events are taken to be exogenous.
29Hausman test in all regressions support this estimator. Test results are not reported but are
avaliable.
30For those unfamiliar with dynamic panel data see Baltagi (1995) in general and Baltagi Wu
(1999) and Bhargava et al. (1982) concerning the test statistics used.
20language groups, (Swiss-)German, French, Italian, and Rhaeto-Romanic, and the
other, often substantial groups, bundled as ”other languages”. For the religious in-
dex the denominations identi…ed in the data are Roman-Catholic, Christian-Catholic,
Protestant, Israelite, and “other” or “no denomination”.
Both the religious (RF) and the linguistic fractionalization (LF) indexes are cal-
culated as






; i = 1;:::;I
where the i’s stand for the religious or the linguistinc groups. The index measures the
probability that two randomly selected persons from a given canton will not belong
to the same religious or linguistic group. Therefore, the higher the index, the more
fragmented the country.31
Table 2 presents regression results for …xed e¤ects regressions for each of the direct
democratic institution whenever they were present in a canton or a year. In the …rst
…ve columns we control for canton and year speci…c e¤ects and model the error term
as an AR(1) process. We see that the time length available has a positive e¤ect:
the more time has been available for the collection of the signatures the higher has
been the fraction of fatal to total number of accidents. This seems paradoxical. One
can either think that dividing by the total number of accidents is not a good way to
scale the tra¢c fatalities. Alternatively one can argue that ther may be a non-linear
relationship with the time available. Introducing the time contraint squared does not
seem to be permissible as there is a very high autocorrelation with the linear time
variable. In the last …ve columns we present the regressions were the error terms are
not modelles as an autoregressive process but where we still control for canton and
year …xed e¤ects.
In table 3 we turn to another measure of quality in this case related to the health
secotor. For most countries the infant mortality rate is a closely scrutinized statistic
that indicates how e¢cient and e¤ectively the health sector works. Looking at the
regression result we …nd a very strong relationhip between the number of signatures
and the infant mortality rate. The higher the number of singnatures that have to
be collected the higher is the mortality rate. One still have to be carful with the
interpretation of this result. We take the infant mortality rate as an indicaor of
the quality of the health sector and we do not mean to say the there is a direct
medical bene…t form reducing the number of signatures for the survivial probability
of life-borns. Neverthelss the size of the coe¢cient is surpising: reducing the ratio
of signatures to the total size of the electorate by one per cent is associated by a
reduction of one per mille on the infant mortality rate which is quite considerable.
31Entering both measures jointly is a bit problematic due to the high groupwise correlation between
these indexes. However the coe¢cients on the political variables, which are the focus of this paper,
where not sensitive to model speci…cations for the regressions on infant mortality rate but were so
for the fatal accidents ratio.
21In general the time constraint coe¢cient should be judged with some caution. It is
not simply the time to collect the signatures that is the relevant temporal dimension
for the e¤ectiveness of a direct democratic institution, but the time between the
beginning of the collection of signatures and the moment when the issue is put in
front of the electorate. Cantonal parliaments have a considerable disretion as for
when to schedule the date of the vote. It would be interesting to look more closely at
the e¤ect of the time span between the end of collecting signatures and the day of the
actual vote. On the other hand when to many initiatives are submitted they create
a long waiting list for votes which can equally be seen as a cost of these institution.
These questions will be addressed by an updated data set in a future paper.
A note on polarisation
In table (4) we also introduced an interaction term between the linguistic frac-
tionalization and the number of signatures variables to investigate the co-movement
of the variables. We …nd a very strong e¤ect: the higher the degree of linguistic fac-
tionalization toghether with a more signatures to collect the worse is the associated
mortality rate.
4 Conclusions
The results of the theoretical and the empirical part are quite suggestive. Taking
the drastic measures of quality used in this paper surely is some sort of a worse
case scenario which re‡ect when problems of governance of a particular sort. More
empirical and theoretical work can be done to get an even better understanding
as to the underlying mechanisms of quality of public goods and how they can be
in‡uenced by changes in the decision taking process. For instance the measure of the
time constraint that is available to collect signatures is not the only time dimension
that need to be considered. Cantonal parliaments have a lot of discretion when to
call for a vote on an issue that has satis…ed the rules of number of signatures and the
time constraint. They therefore can wait for a time when things have ”cooled down”,
i.e. when the public opinion is less focused on a particular issue so that a law that has
been unpopular can be more easily enacted. On the other hand the legislature need to
be aware of the potential back…ring of such a strategy: when the public understands
that the date of votes or scheduled in way that is most convenient for the ruling
parties they may su¤er in public prestige reducing their incumbency advantage over
the opposition. Equally when too many iniciatives su¢ce the legal requirements than
this can create a long waiting list of votes to be held. Yet having a vote on every other
Sunday can not be the answer as the electorate need to be informed and also need to
be able to aggregate the information for an election outcome to be e¢cient.32 These
questions need to be addressed by a model that encompasses these issues and also the
32See Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1997) for a model of information aggregation.
22necessary data need to be collected which. The empirical evidence on the legislative
delay however gave no support to any of these problems but these are necessarily
examined after the event of an initiaitve and these were not numerous enough to get
good estimates for every canton and every year.
4.0.2 Future extensions and open questions
A number of questions remain open for further investigation in this setting both from
a theoretical and an empirical view. First, the model does not contain any lobbying.
One could have introduced the possiblity of direct transfers to a lobby which, possibly,
represents the interests of type j citizens. Then the approach for investigating the
e¤ect of the direct democratic institution is to ask how much rents the legislators can
extract form the lobbies with and without citizens’ inititatives. Interest groups in
Switzerland are indeed powerful and an intersting feature is the reputation enjoyed
by di¤erent lobbyists. Casual observations of the interest groups suggests that those
lobbies associated with one of the ruling parties have a lower reputation than those
that are not: the former seemed to be identi…ed as another instrument of power
whereas the latter are more trusted to be genuinly interested in the issue they are
persuing.
Second, the empirical examples presented in this chapter suggest that the dy-
namics are not yet well captured. How should we model the time-span between the
moment when an initiative is submitted, then voted, and, if need be, implemented?
Or, in other words: how can we correctly estimate the lag of the e¤ect on quality of
the administrative rule determing its cost and openness. Unfortunately the current
data does not really give a satisfying answer as the discussion on the “legislative de-
lay” has shown: there are simply not enough events to get a reliable estimate of the
delay created by the legislator or for submitted initiatives to be dealt with. Moreover
legislation on this delay varies between cantons and across time varying form total
discretion to quite short delays. This could also be an avenue for further but mainly
emprical work.
A more detailed analysis of the dynamics is yet even more necessary to look at
questions of electoral business cycles. How do business cycles change when initiatives
are available to the citizens. The Swiss political and administrative system with its
high independence and decentralized decision taking on a cantonal level can be a
very rich source of data for comparative studies complementing theoretical work and
empirical evidence from the U.S. as in Besley Case (1995b).
Another interesting issue that has been negelected in the analysis so far is the
e¤ect of tax-competition between cantons The canton of Zug for example has the
highest concentration of companies in Switzerland re‡ecting the favourable marginal
tax rates. The question can also be formulated from the voters perspective as with
an information strucutre as in the Swiss cantons, voters learn a lot about how public
goods are provided in di¤erent cantons which increase the e¤ect of yardstick compe-
23tition as discussed, for example, in Besley, Case (1995a).
Finally there is also a potential in describing in more detail the di¤erent electoral
processes and the types of citizens’ initiatives. We have assumed that voters can
choose which party member to re-elect on the list which therefore gave her an incentive
to satisfy voters in the …rst period. “Open list”, as this voting rule is called, can also
be replaced by a “closed list” where voters only get to choose a party but not directly
the politician. Even if there can be an indirect e¤ect such that parties signal that
they replaced a politician in the current period this by no means need to be the
only equilibrium. A more detailed analysis complete with an emprical test could be
interesting.
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27Fig1: Classes of coalition equilibria
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L HTable 1 - Data sources, definitions and summary statistics of included variables.
Variables
Number 
of obs. Mean Min Max Data source
Quality measures
Number of traffic fatalities 558 52.7276 1 252 1)
Total number of traffic accidents 558 3704.982 301 122285 1)
Ratio number of fatilities to total number of 
accidents. 558 0.0176 0.0011 0.0592 1)
Infant mortality rate (number of deaths of 
children less than one year of age per 1,000 
live births) 558 8.79 1.18 26 1)
Political variables
Required signatures that need to be collected for a vote to be held for a
- constitutional initiative total revision 
(absolut number) 537 5796 300 30000 2)
- constitutional initiative total revision (as a 
ratio to size of electorate) 537 0.0377 0.0073 0.2126 2)
- constitutional initiative partial revision 
(absolut number) 560 5683 300 15000 2)
- constitutional initiative partial revision (as 
ratio to size of electorate) 560 0.0361 0.0073 0.2126 2)
- legislative initiative (absolut number) 560 4990 300 15000 2)
- legislative initiative (as a ratio to size of 
electorate) 560 0.0318 0.0073 0.1417 2)
- legislative optional referendum (absolut 
number) 370 3989 300 12000 2)
- legislative optional referendum (as a ratio 
to size of electorate) 370 0.0289 0.0067 0.1174 2)
- expenditure optional referendum (absolut 
number) 425 3614 300 12000 2)
- expenditure optional referendum (as a 
ratio to size of electorate) 425 0.0232 0.0065 0.1174 2)
Time constraint in months to collect the required signatures for a
- constitutional initiative total revision 537 14.82 2 24 2)
- constitutional initiative partial revision 560 14.36 2 24 2)
- legislative initiative 560 14.21 2 24 2)
- legislative optional referendum 370 1.9103 1 3 2)
- expenditure optional referendum 425 2.2053 1 24 2)
Control variables
Education (fraction of the population with at 
least 12 years of education) 567 0.1605 0.0814 0.3203 1) *
Real per capita cantonal revenue (in prices 
of 1990) 560 331.7 213.03 694.76 1) **
Religion (Index of religious fractionalization) 560 0.4466 0.0931 0.6784 1) *
Language (Index of linguistic 
fractionalization) 560 0.3155 0.1284 0.588 1) *
* Based on Census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990 and linearly interpolated.
** Deflated by the federal consumer price index. Cantonal CPI are not available.
Note: Yearly observations from 1970-1996 for 21 Swiss Cantons. Sources: 1) Swiss Federal Statistical 
Yearbooks (various years) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office (vraious deprtments) 2) Trechsel and Serdült 
(1999) used by courtesy of Alexander Trechsel. Data available on request.Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constitutional initiative total revision:
signatures per electorate 0.0064 0.027
(0.329) (0.023)
time constraint 0.0002** 0.00022***
(0.0001) (0.00009)
Constitutional Initiative partial revision:
signatures per electorate 0.012 0.036
(0.35) (0.023)
time constraint (months) 0.0002** 0.00023***
(0.0001) (0.00009)
Legislative initiative:
signatures per electorate 0.007 0.037
(0.043) (0.030)
time constraint (months) 0.0002** 0.00023***
(0.0001) (0.00009)
Legislative optional referendum:
signatures per electorate 0.0184 0.055
(0.67) (0.050)
time constraint (months) 0.0186* 0.026***
(0.0096) (0.008)
Expenditure optional referendum:
signatures per electorate -0.0097 0.011
(0.072) (0.051)
time constraint (months) 0.00078 0.0010
(0.0018) (0.0015)
education -0.1025*** -0.141*** -0.1414*** -0.089* -0.239*** -0.67** -0.1047*** -0.1039*** -0.032 -0.1796***
(0.0394) (0.037) (0.037) (0.0479) (0.045) (0.028) (0.0258) (0.026) (0.037) (0.033)
real per capita cantonal revenue 0.00003* 0.00003** 0.00004** 0.00001 0.00004** 0.00003** 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 0.00001 0.00005***
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.0000142) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002)
linguistic fractionalization 0.026 0.0078 0.0077 0.0125 0.037* 0.0232* 0.0006 0.000036 0.145 0.0198
(0.018) (0.016) (0.0162) (0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0141) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0176) (0.153)
Canton and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Error term modelled as AR(1) YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Joint significance of fixed effects 16.38*** 15.98*** 15.74*** 9.65*** 12.31***
Bhargave 1) 1.54 1.49 1.49 1.61 1.54
Baltagi-Wu 1) 1.65 1.61 1.60 1.74 1.67
Number of observations 514 537 537 351 402 535 558 558 368 423
1) Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally best invariant (LBI) test statistic that rho = 0 and a modified version of the Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Note: Results of fixed effects regression with two-way error component model. In the first five columns the error terms are modelled as AR(1) processes but not in the last five columns. Coefficients on 
the constant terms ommitted. See Table 1 for data description and sources. Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level.  
Table 2 - Openness of direct democratic institutions and effect on the ratio of traffic fatalities to total number of accidents.
Fraction of fatal to total number of accidents. Dependent variable
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Constitutional initiative total revision:
signatures per electorate 25.766* 29.82***
(14.1001) (10.397)
time constraint -0.0105 -0.0110
(0.0461) (0.0396)
Constitutional Initiative partial revision:
signatures per electorate 26.11* 29.61***
(14.86) (10.657)
time constraint (months) -0.011 -0.0099
(0.046) (0.0394)
Legislative initiative:
signatures per electorate 25.07 34.22**
(18.51) (13.75)
time constraint (months) -0.011 -0.0078
(0.046) (0.0396)
Legislative optional referendum:
signatures per electorate 9.38 24.663
(29.02) (23.304)
time constraint (months) 7.37* 8.033*
(4.11) (3.79)
Expenditure optional referendum:
signatures per electorate 78.14** 72.388***
(30.48) (23.34)
time constraint (months) -0.083 -0.0926
(0.725) (0.6554)
education 16.184 10.39 9.86 28.70 32.31* 34.021*** 28.753** 29.024** 52.32*** 54.886***
(15.793) (14.55) (14.63) (19.69) (17.93) (12.827) (11.8961) (12.016) (17.31) (14.95)
real per capita cantonal revenue 0.005 0.0055 0.0058 -0.0009 -0.005 0.0096 0.0099 0.01002 -0.00026 -0.0013
(0.0076) (0.0072) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.00652) (0.0083) (0.0073)
religious fractionalization -5.004 -5.42 -4.16 -7.66 -14.67 -8.277 -8.999 -6.9086 -9.048 22.84
(11.595) (11.50) (11.59) (13.67) (20.92) (10.012) (9.915) (9.874) (12.25) (17.75)
linguistic fractionalization 2.964 0.03 -0.51 13.97 -13.10 0.014 -3.02 -3.916 11.898 -21.16
(7.650) (6.83) (6.86) (8.99) (10.06) (6.683) (5.964) (5.959) (8.193) (8.625)
Canton and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Error term modelled as AR(1) YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
Joint significance of fixed effects 14.65*** 14.61*** 15.04*** 10.07*** 12.09***
Bhargave 
1)
1.81 1.80 1.80 1.89 1.80
Baltagi-Wu 
1)
1.87 1.86 1.86 1.95 1.88
Number of observations 514 537 537 351 402 535 558 558 368 423
1) Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally best invariant (LBI) test statistic that rho = 0 and a modified version of the Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Note: Results of fixed effects regression with two-way error component model. In the first five columns the error terms are modelled as AR(1) processes but not in the last five columns. Coefficients on 
the constant terms ommitted. See Table 1 for data description and sources. Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level.  
Table 3 - Openness of direct democratic institutions and effect on infant mortality rate.
Infant mortality rate 